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 Fossil fuel development on federal lands accounts for 24% of all U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions.1 These emissions can be reduced significantly by requiring federal oil and gas 
development activity to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.2  
 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has authority to define the terms and conditions of 
new oil and gas leases and to impose conditions of approval on existing leases at the drilling stage. 
Using this authority, the BLM could require net zero emissions on some existing and all new oil 
and gas leases without waiting for congressional action or regulatory changes.  
 This approach would allow for continued production while a long-term climate strategy is 
developed and still drive significant GHG emission reductions in the meantime. Additionally, 
green jobs would be created by incentivizing oil and gas operators to generate offset credits by 
plugging the more than 2 million orphaned or abandoned oil and gas wells that litter the landscape. 
Finally, the incentive to plug idle wells and retire leases early would reward operators for deciding 
to keep some fossil fuel resources in the ground.  
1. The BLM has the legal authority to impose a net zero requirement on existing leases that 
have not been drilled yet. 
 Oil and gas development occurs in three phases. First, the BLM determines which lands are 
available for leasing when it prepares landscape scale Resource Management Plans. These plans 
“shall” be amended when new information becomes available or when circumstances change.3 
Second, prior to a lease sale, the BLM analyzes individual leases and may use this information to 
impose stipulations that protect other resources managed by the BLM. Third, before approving an 
Application to Drill (APD), the BLM conducts a final analysis and imposes conditions of approval 
as necessary to mitigate harm to other resources.  
 There are 38,294 existing federal oil and gas leases, but only 24,127 of them are producing oil 
or gas.4 That means that there are potentially 14,167 leases (covering over 13.3 million acres) that 
have been sold, but not yet drilled. On January 27, 2021, President Biden signed an Order to “pause 
new oil and natural gas leases on public lands” in order to reconsider leasing practices in light of 
“potential climate and other impacts associated with oil and gas activities.”5 Addressing the 
potential GHG emissions arising from these existing leases is critical to achieving net-zero 
emissions on federal lands.  
 The BLM has authority to impose a net-zero requirement on existing leases when the 
operator applies to drill a well. The BLM retains extensive contractual and regulatory authority 
to impose mitigation measures as a condition of approval at the APD stage.6 The BLM has used 
this authority to incorporate mitigation measures into drilling plans, even if those requirements 
were not identified at the time of the lease sale.7 Both the BLM and industry have justified 
expedited environmental analyses at the leasing stage by promising to mitigate impacts at the APD 
stage.8 Thus, operators already expect that mitigation measures will be imposed at the APD stage. 
A net zero requirement is an appropriate way to minimize adverse impacts to land, air, water, 
cultural, and biological resources, and other users, as required by the Standard Lease Terms. 
 The BLM recently affirmed its authority to impose GHG mitigation measures at the APD 
stage. In WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, the federal district court for the District of Columbia 
remanded the BLM’s sale of 283 parcels because the “BLM failed to take a ‘hard look’ at GHG 
emissions.”9 The BLM then prepared an Environmental Assessment, promising to mitigate GHG 
emissions at the APD stage through conditions of approval and best management practices (in 
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addition to applicant committed measures and state air quality permits).10 Other BLM field offices 
already impose GHG mitigation through Best Management Practices or Conditions of Approval 
at the APD stage, further demonstrating the BLM’s existing authority. For example, the Colorado 
BLM State Office strategy for reducing emissions from oil and gas development through best 
management practices includes GHG emission control measures.11  
2. The BLM also has the authority to impose a net zero requirement on all new leases 
through two additional mechanisms. 
 Before leasing ever occurs, the BLM can revise land use plans to impose a net zero emissions 
stipulation on all new oil and gas activity. Recent data regarding climate change constitutes a 
change in circumstances that justifies revising land use plans. Failure to mitigate GHG emissions 
from oil and gas development activity will exacerbate climate change, resulting in permanent 
impairment of atmospheric resources and unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands. Both of 
these results would be contrary to the BLM’s management mandate.12 
 Even if the BLM does not update an existing RMP, the site-specific environmental analysis 
required at the leasing stage provides an opportunity to assess whether the assumptions supporting 
the RMP decision remain valid, and whether adaptive management strategies require that 
mitigation measures be imposed.13 Because the lease is a contract, the BLM has broad authority to 
define the terms of the contract prior to sale, and stipulations have been used in a wide variety of 
contexts to adjust lease terms to avoid adverse effects related to energy development.14 
Exacerbating climate change is an adverse effect of energy development and GHG mitigation 
should be incorporated into the terms of the lease to create predictability for future development. 
3. Imposing a net zero mitigation requirement would be consistent with the BLM’s existing 
statutory, regulatory, and contractual mitigation authority.  
 Three statutes and their implementing regulations provide authority for the BLM to impose 
GHG mitigation requirements during the oil and gas permitting process in order to protect other 
resources consistent with the BLM’s multiple use mandate.  
 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)15 directs the BLM to balance 
multiple uses and avoid permanent impairment of resources, including atmospheric values.16 It 
also imposes a mandatory duty to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation.17 GHG emissions 
from fossil fuel development on public lands accounts for 24% of U.S. emissions, and continued 
development will result in permanent impairment and unnecessary or undue degradation of the 
lands.18 Since at least 2008, the BLM has recognized that its authority to identify and implement 
mitigation measures (both onsite and offsite of mineral development leases) arises out of FLPMA 
and the authority to regulate public land uses.19  
 Regulations under the Mineral Leasing Act require that “all operations” be conducted in a 
manner that “protects other natural resources and the environmental quality.”20 Supporting 
regulations specify that operators must conduct all operations in a manner that protects “other 
natural resources and environmental quality.”21 Mitigating GHG emissions will protect other 
natural resources and environmental quality. 
 The National Environmental Policy (NEPA) and the Department of Interior’s implementing 
regulations impose procedural requirements to consider alternatives, including mitigation.22 These 
requirements are unaffected by recent changes to the CEQ’s NEPA regulations.23  
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 The BLM utilizes a Standard Lease Form to solemnize the contract it enters into with oil and 
gas operators. Plain language of the Standard Lease Form puts every lessee on notice that the right 
to drill for oil and gas on federal land is subject to the duty to minimize adverse impacts, even if 
those impacts are not contemplated at the time of the lease sale. Additionally, operations may be 
restricted for environmental reasons.24 The plain language of the standard lease form notifies each 
lessee that the BLM reserves contractual authority to impose additional mitigation and reclamation 
measures after the lease is signed and when the lessee applies to drill.  
4. Existing disclosure procedures can be used to calculate GHG offset requirements.  
 The existing regulatory and legal structure already requires oil and gas operators to disclose 
GHG emissions associated with new drilling activity.25 Most permitting processes include a 
Reasonably Foreseeable Development Scenario setting forth estimated well or mine production, 
which can be used to anticipate downstream emissions.26 This “serves as a baseline” in the NEPA 
analysis,27 and could be used to anticipate offset requirements. That baseline could be compared 
against actual production to ensure that the offset estimate was accurate.  
5. Standards for offset validation and verification exist and can be used to set the net zero 
mitigation requirement. 
 A robust international market for voluntary carbon reductions and offsets already exists and is 
used widely.28 The carbon offset industry has developed voluntary standards for proper 
accounting, transparency, and certification.29 Those standards ensure that carbon credits are real, 
measurable, permanent, not already required by law, independently verified, unique, and 
contribute to sustainable development. The infrastructure created by the existing voluntary carbon 
market can be used to validate and verify the net-zero offset requirement without imposing a new 
regulatory burden on the BLM.  
 Using a well-established technical standard developed voluntarily by industry is consistent 
with long-standing federal law and guidance. Guidance issued by the Office of Management and 
Budget and in effect since the 1980s directs federal agencies, where practicable, to utilize privately 
developed standards rather than writing new, government-unique standards.30 Section 12(d) of the 
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 also directs that unless inconsistent 
with law or impractical, all federal agencies should use “technical standards that are developed or 
adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies . . . to carry out [the agencies’] policy objectives 
or activities.”31 
6. Operators could achieve offset credits by retiring leases early, plugging idle wells, or by 
plugging orphaned or abandoned wells.  
 Emissions avoidance is an important strategy for achieving net zero emissions. Operators could 
create offset credits by retiring leases early and choosing to leave some resources in the ground.32 
 Idle wells emit significant methane emissions without benefitting society.33 In 2019, the 
Government Accountability Office identified 2,294 idle wells that have not produced oil or gas 
since June 2008.34 With industry forecasts predicting that prices will remain below 2008 levels for 
at least thirty more years, it is unlikely that these wells will be brought back into production, which 
means that they will continue to emit and that they face an increased risk of becoming orphaned 
or abandoned.35 Operators could achieve offset credits by plugging idle wells early to avoid 
unnecessary and harmful GHG emissions.  
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 Orphaned and abandoned wells also present a problem. The EPA estimates that the population 
of unplugged abandoned oil and gas wells was around 2.1 million in 2018.36 These orphans have 
steadily produced between 6 and 7 million metric tons (MMT) of CO2 equivalent annually between 
1990 and the present, primarily through methane emissions.37 Operators could achieve offset 
credits by plugging orphaned and abandoned wells for which they have no existing legal 
responsibility to remediate. 
 The American Carbon Registry has already approved a methodology for offset protocols for 
methane capture projects including coal mines.38 A clear methodology is important due to 
variability in the amounts of GHG emissions released by different wells.39 Currently, the American 
Carbon Registry is in the process of developing a methodology that will standardize the way 
abandoned well projects can participate in the offsetting registry.40  
7. Imposing a net-zero requirement on new oil and gas development would contribute to 
green jobs by putting oil field workers to work. 
 After a downturn in oil and gas prices in 2014, the number of idle and orphaned wells increased 
beyond the ability of existing policy measures to identify, manage, and clean-up those wells.41 The 
same dynamic is unfolding today, further exacerbating the problem. Oil and gas bankruptcies in 
the United States and Canada rose 50% in 2019, and analysts say the rate is likely to accelerate 
with the pandemic-related slide in energy prices.42 That will increase the number of abandoned 
wells and decrease the operators available to plug them.  
 Companies that declare bankruptcy or shutter operations have few resources to plug idle wells, 
and bonding requirements rarely cover the cost of plugging these wells. A recent Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report found a vast discrepancy between the cost of plugging a well 
and the financial bond posted by operators, which creates an incentive for operators to abandon 
wells instead of reclaiming them.43 Bond minimums do not reflect the characteristics of individual 
wells, such as depth or location, even though those characteristics affect the cost.44 Even though 
the complexity of drilling and the cost of plugging wells has increased, the minimum bond 
requirements have remained unchanged since the 1960s.45 The average cost of plugging a well 
ranges from $20,000 in a low-cost scenario to $145,000 in a high-cost scenario.46 Considering only 
the 2,294 wells that have not produced since 2008, the GAO estimated that the cost of reclamation 
could range from $46 million in a low-cost scenario to $333 million in a high cost scenario. An 
offsetting program would incentivize solvent operators to help resolve this otherwise 
unmanageable problem. 
 Some oil and gas industry workers have already sought ways to pivot their skills from drilling 
oil and gas wells to plugging them.47 Offsetting requirements would support these potential green 
jobs. Offsetting requirements could also supplement proposals to remediate wells through stimulus 
packages. For example, the House of Representatives included funding to plug abandoned wells 
using laid-off oil and gas workers in the July infrastructure bill.48 
 In summary, achieving net-zero emissions on federal lands will require quick and creative 
action. Using its existing contractual and regulatory authority, the BLM can impose a net-zero 
requirement on all new wells and all new leases. This approach would provide certainty to industry, 
create green jobs, and help resolve a looming crisis of orphaned and abandoned wells.
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